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Over a very long period of time, New Zealand's structural 
policy has devoted a low priority to the export sector. Up till the 
1960's, New Zealand seemingly got away with the strategy for the 
agricultural segment of the export sector at least, as a result of 
rapid technical change. After this the impediments to growth became 
more obvious. 
Attempts were then 
imports with more protection 
export incentives etc). 
compensation. 
made to partially offset protection for 
(assistance) for export industries (SMP's, 
This is technically known as tariff 
The general conclusions that emerge from this discussion are: 
i) A clear picture of the structure, conduct and performance of 
major industries and policies with the notable exception of the farm 
sector is not available. As a result it is very difficult to design a 
balanced restructuring programme. It is even more difficult to 
convince the public that the approach being taken is worthwhile, 
reasonable and equitable. 
ii) The inertia and vested interest in the status quo makes it most 
likely that the past policy cycle will repeat itself at a large cost to 
society as a whole and particularly to the farm sector. 
iii) Regardless of the trade policy settings chosen in the future 
(and they are crucial) there are a wide range of policy changes 
required to ensure that regulation and other distortions do not 
compound the bias against the export sector of the economy, including 
agriculture. These include stabilisation and exchange rate policies 





"On some issues, New Zealand seems to be trapped in a 
time capsule. For decades, we thud around inside the 
glass, running through the same old cycle hoping 
that this time we can break out and knowing that we 
are following a familiar routine." David Beatson 
(1985) 
Over the last one hundred years, New Zealand's development 
strategy can be characterised as being inward looking (insulationist) 
with a large element of central direction. 
Since 1888, successive Governments have intervened in the 
workings of the private sector using a wide range of policy 
instruments. At first glance it may appear as if there has been little 
or no common theme to these interventions. Nevertheless for long 
periods of time, basic policy strands are adhered to. At the same time 
interventions are made to moderate or slightly alter the direction 
imposed by the policy instruments making up the theme. This continual 
process which firstly, reinforces the direction of the policy and then 
proceeds to modify it in many ways, is a major strength of the 
democratic process, but it does make it more difficult to recognise and 
explain the direction, or even to know if there is a direction. 
Another feature of the history of agricultural policy in New 
Zealand is that more often than not, we seem to have "been there 
before" in one form or another. An earlier quotation illustrates this 
fact: 
"The most fundamental difficulty has been and still is 
the reduction of farming costs (including mortgage 
interest) to levels comparable with the new levels of 
export prices. Despite the fluctuating and at times 
very high prices of some years, the farming industries 
as a whole have suffered heavily. There have been and 
must still be reductions in land values: some land 
has gone out of cultivation, a great deal more has not 
been adequately worked for lack of adequate capital, 
and generally there has been a marked economic 
weakness in the rural industries", Condliffe (1930). 
The familiarity of Condliffe's problem is in large part a 
result of the economic development strategy that has been adopted over 
a century. Relative returns and relative costs in New Zealand's export 
industries have been kept deliberately low compared to those in the 
import substitution industries. In fact this bias is probably greater 
today than it was in the year 1920 to which Condliffe was referring. 
The author wishes to thank Mary Wood-Belton for her computational 
assistance and to acknowledge the constructive comments received from 
Mr J Pryde, Professor A C Rayner, Mr Les Woods, and Mr Ron Sheppard. 





The development of New Zealand's agricultural resources over 
the past 150 years has been an outstanding accomplishment in 
international terms. It is easy, however, to exaggerate the relative 
importance of climate, soils and other biospherical characteristics and 
to underestimate the infrastructure that has been built up supporting 
all aspects of producing, processing and marketing farm based products 
to the world. 
This infrastructure includes rural communities with their 
associated service industries, public and private research 
establishments, education facilities at all levels, information and 
marketing systems and public services including trade negotiators and 
quality control systems. All have had important roles to play in the 
development of the industry. They will continue to do so provided they 
continually 'adapt to changing needs. At the present time some of these 
changes are well overdue. 
For most of the nineteenth century, government played a neutral 
role in economic development attending to society's and industry's 
infrastructural requirements. During this early period, high levels of 
material welfare were attained. New Zealand is reputed to have had the 
highest standard of living in the world towards the end of the 1890's, 
Gould (1982). Given the resource endowment at the time (low population 
density) and the state of technology and infrastructure, the 
Agricultural Sector contributed most to total real income. 
It is worth digressing slightly at this point to recognise that 
had resource endowment differed at that time, so too the relative 
importance of farming would have been different. Agriculture happened 
to be able to exploit a wider range of market opportunities and 
technological breakthroughs than other sectors at the time. This fact 
told policymakers at the time very little about what the future 
importance of agriculture in New Zealand was to be. 
Over the same period of time, high levels of relative economic 
performance coincided with high and variable levels of labour 
unemployment in the face of the international business cycle. This was 
the golden age of laissez-faire and social concerns that had been 
brewing for some time spilled over into action for change. The problem 
was attacked from a number of angles but this discussion focuses mainly 
on the industrial development approach that was used. Other policy 
approaches are perhaps more important to the solution of the 
unemployment problem but have probably had less impact on intersectoral 
growth. 
One of the forms of government intervention that was adopted 
was the imposition (or raising) of tariffs on imports. The decision 
(in 1888) to use an 'import substitution' strategy to promote 
employment, had different effects in New Zealand as compared to other 
high income countries. There were three reasons for this: 
(i) agriculture was the largest sector in the economy, 




(iii) foreign trade constituted a relatively large proportion 
of Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) 
As a contrasting case, the United States raised import tariffs 
on average from 10 per cent to 25 per cent at the turn of the century 
(Figure 1). The impact on industry and agriculture in that country was 
quite different because farming was much smaller (relatively), 
international trade was unimportant in the economy and export earnings, 
such as were required, were contributed by a variety of sectors, 
Economic Council (1975). 
The decision to address the unemployment issue in New Zealand 
using trade policy was complicated at the time by the political weight 
of the farm lobby. 
In simplistic terms, there were two main ways of reducing 
unemployment. It could have been addressed by providing a buffer of 
privately controlled resources or a buffer of publicly financed 
resources. A private buffer could have been provided by stimulating 
economic activity in the private sector at times of rising 
unemployment. Tariffs and other trade policies would have achieved 
this in the short term by raising the price of imports and raising the 
profitability of producing goods for the local market. Hence the 
demand for labour would have risen. 
The other alternative was a public resource buffer in the form 
of unemployment benefits or special public sector employment. This 
alternative would have required large public revenues. At that time 
the additional tax burden would have been imposed mainly on farmers. 
Related to the employment issue was the infant industry 
argument. This school of thought argued, and still argues, that 
balanced economic development requires initial import protection. In 
New Zealand's case, balanced development was taken to mean expanding 
the manufacturing sector principally by drawing capital and labour 
resources out of agriculture. Tariffs and other import restrictions 
achieved this by providing a subsidy to the import substitute segment 
of manufacturing and other sectors (in the form of the tariff) and an 
implicit tax on the whole export sector in the form of higher costs on 
inputs purchased from the rest of the economy. 
New Zealand was certainly not alone in pursuing this 
development strategy over the period 1895 to 1935. Many countries 
tried the insulation route and it is fair to say that import 
substitution policies failed badly in their attempts to stimulate 
industrial growth, Krueger (1980). Protection artificially raised 
costs and gave incorrect signals to all other firms in the economy. 
The range of market opportunities diminished as a result and along with 
it, the level of economic activity and job prospects. Second, infant 
industries rarely grow up. The industries receiving the highest level 
of protection in New Zealand in 1888 are the industries receiving the 
highest levels of protection today. They include parts of the textile, 
machinery, footwear and light industry sectors, Condliffe (1930). The 
same pattern can be observed overseas. Import protection limits 
expansion and cost reduction opportunities by confining firms to the 
local market. This is especially important in the New Zealand market 
where there is a very small local market in relation to the size 
economies available in many lines of industrial activity. 
FIGURE I IMPORT PROTECTION, TARIFF EQUIVALENT NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1894-1984 (PERCE~7: 
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Apart from employment, the other principal motivation for the 
adoption of the pattern of government intervention, was to promote 
'economic development'. By convention, development at its early stages 
consists of a process of stimulating productivity in the food sector to 
enable it to produce a product surplus and hence enable the food sector 
to provide the capital and labour resources to establish and expand the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. Over time the relative 
size of the agricultural sector will diminish - that is the goal after 
all, Nicholls (1963). This process can be facilitated in a number of 
ways. A passive option would consist of ensuring that the financial 
and labour markets were functioning smoothly to effect the resource 
transfer required. The approach adopted in New Zealand might be 
characterised as passive prior to 1935 but after this period was more 
active. An active development strategy involves attempts to speed up 
the resource transfer by discriminating in favour of the 
non-agricultural sector and discriminating against agriculture using 
taxes and subsidies. 
Development policies of this type involve costs in terms of 
living standards and lower agricultural incentives in the short term, 
but in large countries with balanced resource endowments, the short 
term distortions created may be justified to some extent by the longer 
term gains. 
Many countries in Europe and America have been in this 
position. New Zealand, however, is somewhat peculia,r in this regard. 
With the benefit of hindsight it be seen that New Zealand was going to 
depend heavily on the agricultural sector for a long time after the 
inception of active economic development policies in the early part of 
the twentieth century. Discrimination against agriculture at this time 
created the incentive for resource transfers at the expense of future 
farm output, other things being equal. 
Other things were not equal of course and that brings the 
discussion to the subsequent time period. Beginning in 1935, 
successive New Zealand governments reinforced the active development 
strategy by expanding the regulatory environment considerably, and by 
instituting higher tariffs and import licensing. The high level of 
discrimination in favour of local production and therefore against 
exporting was largely a response to the depression and reflected 
similar regimes in other countries. The crucial difference in the New 
Zealand case was the fact that it was kept in place for 40 years. 
From the end of the 1930's, most other developed countries 
embarked on a process of reducing protection for the import substitute 
sectors of their economies. This is demonstrated by the tariff 
reductions by the United States and Canada after 1935 shown in Figure 
1. This process was further stimulated by the successive GATT 
multilateral trade rounds from the late 1940's. The major reduction in 
protection achieved, contributed to a rapid increase in world trade in 
industrial products over a 40 year period. The trade growth in turn 
was a major source of economic growth for these countries. New Zealand 
missed out on this source of growth to a large extent, in part as a 
result of continuing high protection levels. World trade access for 
some industrial goods (including cars, textiles, clothing, footwear and 
some electronic goods) deteriorated during the late 1970's but these 
products are not likely to form a major part of the market niches in 
which New Zealand's comparative advantage in manufacturing lies. These 
more recent trade access restrictions tend to be limited to products 
like stereos, video cassette recorders, standard cars and other 
7. 
products with long production runs which do not usually suit the 
strengths of the New Zealand manufacturing sector. 
How did agriculture survive, and in fact grow rapidly, over the 
period from 1890 to 1970? The first and major reason was technological 
change, broadly defined. On an international scale the sustained rate 
of productivity increase in New Zealand agriculture was remarkable over 
much of this period. The technological change was highly tuned to the 
physical and economic conditions which faced the agriculture sector. 
It evolved from the efforts of farmers and other private firms 
supported by Government and University research, the latter largely 
sponsored by the taxpayer. Partially subsidised extension services 
assisted in disseminating the information provided from the research 
effort. 
Secondly, governments partially compensated the agricultural 
sector for the excessive cost structure and loss of flexibility created 
by the regulated environment and the import substitution policy. Some 
of these compensating programmes are included in Figure 2 and Appendix 
1. The compensation was clearly only partial and this can be seen by 
comparing the rate of assistance in Figures 1 and 2. 
In spite of the compensation bias remaining, especially after 
1935, the bank of technical knowledge built up from 1880 to 1960 was 
sufficient to enable agriculture to grow rapidly through the 1960's. 
However, the reduced financial incentives severely reduced the 
exploitation of export market opportunities. In this important sense 
New Zealand's living standards were lower and grew less rapidly than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
This situation of rapid agricultural growth in the face of less 
than full market incentives had some interesting but dangerous side 
effects. One was to create the impression in the minds of New Zealand 
policymakers that no matter what you did to the agricultural sector, or 
the extent it was exploited to promote so-called 'development', the 
industry would keep on growing. In its most extreme form this fallacy 
takes the form of a perverse output response in agriculture, ie. the 
fallacy that if one lowers farm prices and/or income, the farm sector 
will produce more, not less. This misconception may have lead into 
less concern for the--Ionger term effects of the inward looking 
development policy of the time. 
Agricultural output responds positively in the aggregate to the 
level of incentives provided. However, when technical change is 
proceeding rapidly it is very difficult to separate the effects of 
changes in productivity due to technological progress, from market 
incentive effects. 
A second side effect of high protection (and regulation) after 
1935 was the chronic balance of payments situation it engendered; the 
very problem intervention was supposed to solve. This situation over 
many years has reinforced the notion that the state of the balance of 
payments is one of the prime indicators of the nation's wellbeing. 
Clearly it is not. The real living standards of individuals, and 
industry health are the primary indicators of national welfare. Such 
thinking is quite understandable given the level and pattern of 
intervention adopted and the effects it caused. 
The extreme form of development strategy adopted in New Zealand 
in the 1930's had another unfortunate side effect. Pressures for 
FIGURE 2 TOTAL DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE 1934/35 TO 1982/83, REAL DOLLARS (THOUSANDS), DECEMBER 1983 (=1000) 
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balance and equity at the industry and political level led to ad hoc 
measures in abundance, being introduced to compensate for the ill 
effects on the export sector. From an administrative and commercial 
viewpoint, a system developed of trying to have two wrongs make a 
right. The agricultural sector was the recipient of a number of these 
interventions (Bushnell and Gibson 1984). The tax system was adapted 
to create special prOV1S10ns for farmers, regulatory powers were 
granted to farm groups in rather haphazard fashion and assistance and 
selected trade policy measures were added for agricultural commodities. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it has become clear that the 
growth capacity of the economy was being restrained after World War II 
by the overall development policy. The compensation was not sufficient 
to outway the cost and regulatory excesses. Furthermore, opportunities 
were being missed. The cost excesses reduced the opportunities for the 
export sector (manufacturing, agriculture and services) to invest in 
new production and marketing systems, (Gould 1982, and Lloyd 1980). 
Tentative steps were taken from 1967/68 to reduce this 
disincentive to produce for export. Devaluation assisted in realigning 
the exchange rate for all exporters, and manufacturers were partially 
compensated for the cost excesses through export incentive programmes. 
Prior to 1974, these offsets were quite modest in relation to import 
protection disincentives and the regulatory environment. 
9. 
The results of this development policy are documented by Gould 
(1982), Lloyd et al (1980) and others. New Zealand retained its per 
capita income position in the top three countries as late as 1953 
(Gould (1982) p.21). Shortly after this date, however, the cumulative 
effects of the import substitution strategy began to show. In 1960, 
New Zealand had fallen to seventh place, in 1965 to eighth place and in 
1970 to seventeenth place. In 1978, New Zealand was in 22nd position 
in the world in per capita income performance. As discussed by Gould 
(and in contrast to popular belief) the damage done to New Zealand's 
income earning capacity was reflected during the 1950's and 1960's 
rather than the 1970's. This preceded the OPEC crises, Britain's entry 
to the EEC, the volatile international exchange and capital market 
period and a host of other factors that tend to be blamed for our 




Tariffs and import quotas (import licences) were not the only 
instruments which biased incentives against the export sector; 
regulations increasingly played a major part. Of particular concern at 
the aggregate level were foreign exchange control, marketing, quality 
assurance and other regulations which persisted until 1984. Since it 
is easy to confuse the effects, some background may be warranted at 
this point. 
If the export sector (including agriculture) is to be given the 
opportunity to exploit all the viable market opportunities available to 
it, the exchange rate should be at its equilibrium level. The 
equilibrium level is the exchange rate which clears the market for 
goods and services when government policy does not impede the ability 
of New Zealanders to buy and sell goods overseas. At the equilibrium 
exchange rate each sector will receive the most appropriate price and 
cost signals regardless of whether the sector is agriculture or 
manufacturing, export or import oriented. 
Government intervention drives the exchange rate away from this 
equilibrium value and hence, biases development and lowers the standard 
of living of New Zealanders in two main ways. The first has just been 
described. The import tariffs and licences overvalued the New Zealand 
dollar in a structural sense, raising the incentives to produce import 
substitutes and lowering the incentives to produce for export. 
Exchange rate controls and pegging systems can have precisely 
the same effect. This we might call short-term over- or 
undervaluation. These two effects can reinforce the bias against 
export production as they did at the time of the election in 1984. The 
New Zealand dollar was structurally overvalued as a result of the cost 
penalties on exporters imposed by trade policy. In addition, the 
exchange rate system being used overvalued the dollar even more, 
creating a double disincentive for exporting industries. 
It is conceivable, however, that the exchange rate controls 
could have tended to undervalue the dollar at times. In this case the 
short term under-valuation would counteract the structural 
overvaluation due to trade policy bias. Other financial market 
regulations and Government overseas borrowing activity also have major 
effects on the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Marketing regulations and competition policy (or lack of it) 
have been another source of efficiency loss in the agricultural sector 
as a whole. This is a difficult area to evaluate historically because 
some of this regulation may have been seriously distorted over time. 
Some regulations previously introduced to benefit farmers are probably 
now benefiting other groups to the detriment of the farm sector. 
On the other hand, unregulated farm markets have a strong 
propensity to exhibit market failure arising from free-riders in the 
areas of promotion, grading, information and forward marketing. There 
are a number of examples of this occurring in fresh fruit export 
markets in the grading context. At least minimum quality standards are 
required to prevent some firms from ruining market opportunities for 
others. This requires collective action of some type. Unfortunately, 
II. 
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the information base and institutional and legislative arrangements are 
not currently designed to cope with solutions to market failure issues. 
The financial sector appears to be in a better position to cope 
with the changes in policy it faces. In large part of this is because 
Government has in place a more robust information and monitoring system 
than currently exists in the Agricultural or Manufacturing sectors. 
A recent quote by the Associate Minister of Finance, Nr David 
Caygill (NBR 1985), is instructive in this regard. Commenting on a 
major policy change in the finance sector, the Minister is quoted as 
saying, "You look at the compulsory reserve ratio system and you ask -
what's the justification for that? - and the justifications offered 
are proven to be false, if not fraudulent. So you get rid of it. But 
you are still left with the question - does the central bank have a 
role in monitoring the financial soundness in general terms of larger 
financial institutions? Well, yes that seems to make sense", 
The Reserve Bank has devoted significant resources over the 
years to monitoring the performance of the financial sector so the 
Minister is probably correct in assuming that the Bank is up to the 
monitoring task required to follow up on this major policy change. 
The Agricultural Sector is not, in our opinion, similarly 
endowed. The identification of market failure requires a detailed 
monitoring system and collective action to overcome it. Corrective 
action for market failure requires empowering legislation and suitable 
institutions to apply it. Our history of ad hoc partial compensation 
to agriculture has not resulted in legislation nor institutions 
designed to deal with the new agricultural policy. Government services 
to agriculture and sector institutions were designed to deal with the 
old policy set. 
The rapid increase in the size of the Government sector in New 
Zealand and elsewhere resulted from increasing efforts to monitor and 
control the private sector in various ways. Regulation has often been 
used in an attempt to achieve this purpose by fiat. Lay people and 
analysts alike are rapidly coming to the conclusion, based on extensive 
research, that in most cases government regulation becomes perverted 
over time. That is to say. regulations usually end up benefitting a 
group that it was originally intended to control. There are many 
reasons for this, not the least of which is the encouragement given to 
lobby groups to devote significant resources to efforts to offset the 
negative effects of past policy. 
It is important to understand that these comments do not mean 
to infer that malicious intent is necessarily involved in the 
regulation issue. All firms naturally act in accord with the 
intervention signals they receive. Regulation of commercial and 
economic life changes these signals and quite naturally invokes 
reactions which are not desirable from the viewpoint of national 
economic development. 
SECTION 4 
ASSESSMENT OF POLICY CHANGES 
It is possible to quantify these changes in relative industry 
assistance to some extent over the past century. The first index of 
assistance is that afforded the import substitution sector by way of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This assistance is measured as in 
tariff equivalent terms for New Zealand, Canada and the United States 
over the period 1894 - 1984, Figure 1. The New Zealand estimates were 
derived from past studies for individual industries and weighted by 
trade share data given in Appendix 2. 
There is a noticeable gap in the New Zealand protection data in 
the 1930's when the present import system was introduced but the high 
level of assistance to input substitution is obvious after WW II when 
the average nominal rate of protection was of the order of 60 per cent. 
The marked contrast between trends in import protection in New Zealand 
and in North America after the war is clearly visible. 
Import protection has clearly declined in New Zealand since the 
1960's to around 25 percent by 1979 but it is not clear how much 
protection currently remains. Pickford (1984) has estimated the 
nominal protection rate over the period 1981/84 for commodities subject 
to import licence tendering. Based on these findings, a weighted 
average nominal protection rate of around 60 per cent for this period 
has been computed. This is only a partial assessment of the current 
situation. Import goods not subject to licensing tend to have lower 
rates and goods subject to licensing but not tendering tend to have 
higher rates of protection. 
On the other side of the ledger is assistance to the export 
sector. The assistance directed towards the Agricultural Sector was 
mainly in the form of direct Government contributions. The real cost 
of direct Government assistance to Ag'riculture is documented in 
Appendix 1 (Tables 1A and 1B). Total direct assistance derived from 
those tables is shown in Figure 2 in $1983 and expressed as a 
percentage of the net output (GDP) of the farm sector. 
With the exception of the immediate post WJ II period, 
assistance to farming and export agriculture was negligible from the 
depression until 1971. As previously discussed, the adaptability of 
farming offset the effects of the 'export tax' implicitly applied to 
agriculture and other segments of the export sector. Agricultural 
output and productivity continued to expand, at least through until the 
mid 1960's, in spite of the penalty. 
During the latter half of the 1960's, it was becoming apparent 
that the policy bias against the export sector was harming the overall 
economic performance of the country. The establishment of the 
Agricultural Production Council in 1964, the subsequent introduction of 
export incentives for manufacturing and devaluation in 1967 were part 
of the recognition of deeper underlying problems. These initial 
measures were expanded considerably up till 1984 as compensation for 
the bias against exporting. This trend in export assistance is 
reflected in the upsurge in direct Government assistance to Agriculture 
demonstrated in Figure 2. The stated intention of some of these 
schemes (eg. SMP's) was not necessarily the tariff compensation 
13. 
14. 
argument. Chudleigh et al (1983). The need to stimulate output from a 
particular section was often the rationale provided. Whatever, the 
stated purpose however, the actual effect of these compensating 
policies was to partially realign the level of incentives in the export 
sector relative to the import competing sector and with that change 
relative output levels. 
It was during the 1970's and early eighties that major changes 
in relative (export versus import substitution) economic incentives 
were made. Export incentives for manufactured and some horticultural 
products were expanded and initial steps were taken to reduce import 
protectionism; tariffs were reduced, import quotas were expanded and 
remaining import licences were offered for tender. However, there were 
notable exceptions to import liberalisation including exemptions for 
industries adopting 'Industry Development Plans'. 
Looking back, the past decade was a very difficult one to 
choose to carry out major economic restructuring. The outside 
influences were particularly volatile and severe for New Zealand. One 
measure of this is the trend in the terms of trade since 1974 (Figure 
3.) On the other hand the decade produced a confluence of outside 
influences which highlighted the basic problems associated with our 
heritage of development policy. There was also increasing evidence on 
the poor performance of regulatory policy. This has had a major impact 
on the way Government intervention is now viewed. 
The period 1968-84 was characterised by high and volatile 
inflation rates worldwide stemming from the pattern of government 
deficit financing following the Vietnam war and two oil shocks. More 
recently, the world has experienced a savings shortage. which combined 
with inflation has resulted in extremely high real interest rates by 
historical standards. The Keynes prediction that long term real 
interest rates should hover around three per cent is now open to 
serious question. Related to these events has been the epidemic of 
unemployment. 
New Zealand has suffered along with other countries from these 
effects but the influence in this country has been compounded by two 
factors. The pre-1974 economy was not designed for flexibility, indeed 
Hazledine (1984) would argue that this lack of flexibility or 
elasticity is a modern nation's most scarce economic or administrative 
resource. On the contrary. democratic nations, including New Zealand, 
are designed to resist change in all sectors including the service 
sector. Secondly, the economic shocks of the decade were amplified in 
commodity markets in a pattern which was particularly disadvantageous 
for New Zealand. 
The response to this situation was a large increase in short 
term support for the agricultural sectors affected, using SMP's and 
interest rate subsidies particularly. Within the context of tariff 
compensation, however, the rate of assistance offered the agricultural 
sector at its peak (1983) was only a fraction of the assistance 
remaining in the import substitution sector of the economy. 
The relative assistance currently provided to the export and 
import substitution sectors is not evenly spread over the various 
product areas. This is demonstrated in Table 1 which shows the 
effective rates of assistance (in % tariff equivalents) for selected 
export and import substitution sectors. 
FIGURE J NEI-l ZEALAND EXPORT AND IMPORT PRICE INDICES AND TERMS OF TRADE, 1935 TO 1983, (1983 DOLLARS) 
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YEAR 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 
SourC2: National Accounts, various issues. 
\J1 
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The first point that needs to be made is that the estimates 
given in Table 1 are not of even quality. The table does not show 
assistance levels for key specific industries from the point of view of 
farm costs. The rate of assistance, for example to P.V.C. 
manufacturers is 523 percent, and to motor vehicle assembly, 544 
percent (Bushnell and Gibson 1984). 
Second, there are technical problems in the Gibson and Bushnell 
analysis when converting the dollar amounts of assistance to 
Agriculture into percentage terms. These authors implicitly assume 
that all direct assistance to Agriculture is captured by farmers. This 
is not correct and to the extent the benefits of Government assistance 
programmes are shared by farming and allied industries, the percentage 
assistance values in Tables 1 and 2 are too high. For example, if 
SMP's for sheepmeats benefitted allied meat freezing and marketing 
firms to the same extent as sheepfarmers, the assistance level 
(percentage) for sheepmeats in Table 1 would be of the order of 25-40 
percent rather than 75 percent. 
The peak levels of assistance to the agricultural sector 
occurred in 1976, 1979 and 1983. In real dollar terms, this assistance 
ranged from $400-500 million 1983 dollars, Figure 2. This peak level 
of assistance to agriculture needs to be contrasted with the level of 
assistance afforded the import competing industries. It was shown in 
Figure 1 that protection to import substitution industries over the 
period 1955 to 1979 averaged 40 percent or greater. This is part of 
the cost excess which was faced by the export sectors at that time. In 
recent years, the cost excess is thought to have been reduced and 
Government estimates such as those cited in Tables 1 and 2 make the 
assumption that the current 'cost excess' is 20 percent. (This 20 
percent protection level is close to the 17 percent level assumed by 
Philpott (1985) in the current version of his economy-wide model.) If 
we accept the 20 percent 'cost excess' figure for the moment, it 
implies that the import substitution section of the economy is 
receiving assistance of around $1.5 billion in 1983 dollar terms; 3-4 
times the peak level of agricultural assistance. This imbalance is an 
indicator of the degree of disincentive currently being offered the 
agricultural sector. 
Export incentives for manufacturing industries have provided an 
additional buffer for that portion of the export sector. The estimates 
made for the SYNTEC (1984) report suggest that this scheme may have 
compensated for the 'cost excesses' of the import policy. 
However, there is reason to believe that the 20 percent 'cost 
excess' for the export sector is an underestimate of the current 
situation. First, Government has yet to provide a comprehensive 
estimate of current import protection and other cost excesses. The 
SYNTEC report (1984) encompasses only a small number of industries but 
Pickford (1984) has estimated that export products under licence and 
tendering were protected to the extent of 60 percent as recently as 
1983. 
Second, it is not yet clear. how great the cost excesses (over 




Effective Assistance, Selected Export (Pastoral Farming) and 
Import Substitution Sectors (Selected Manufacturing), circa 1980 
Percentage Tariff Equivalent 
SECTOR AGRICULTURE 1 MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Sheepmeat 7S 9 Food, Tobacco 
Wool 10 223 Textiles 
Sheep 34 74 Wood, products 
Beef 3 4S Paper, printing 
Sheep and Beef 23 48 Chemicals 
Petrol, Plastic 
Manufactured Milk 9 17 Mineral Prods. 
Town Milk 45 4 Metal, Basic 
Dairy 12 76 Other Manu. 
Pastoral 20 12 Forestry 
1. The assistance rates for agriculture aSSume that import protection 
resulted in a 20 percent excess. 
Source: Busnell, Peter and Brent Gibson (1984), 'Calculating Assistance 




Forecast Effective Rates of Assistance to Sheepmeats ($m) 
Year Ending 30 September 
======================================================================= 
Forecasts 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
(i) Value of Output (assisted) 
(li) Value of Inputs 
(iii) Value Added 
Assistance to Outputs 
(iv) SMP (export effect) 
(v) SMP (domestic effect) 
(vi) Other assistance to output 
(vii) Total assistance to output 






Total assistance to inputs 
a) 
Effect of manufacturing protection 
(xi) Cost of excess on inputs c) 
Unassisted Value Added 
Assistance to Value Adding 
factors d) 
Net subsidy Equivalent 



























































(a) Meat inspection 1983/84 - 1986/87, Meat hygiene 1983/84 only. 
( b) Livestock incentive 
Hiscellaneous. 
scheme, Agricultural pest control, 






Quarantine, Agricultural research, Animal 
concessions, Taxation concessions, 
Stonyer. E. J., "The Impact of Recent Policy Changes in the 
New Zealand Sheepmeat Industry", Paper presented to the 
Australian Outlook Conference, Canberra. March 1985. 
SECTION 5 
CURRENT POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The fast rate of policy change over recent months is expected 
to radically alter assistance levels to agriculture in 1985 and beyond. 
Government forecasts of the assistance level for sheepmeats over the 
next 3 years are given in Table 2. 
This subsector of agriculture has received the most assistance 
in the recent past. As shown in Table 2, Government has estimated that 
the effective rate of assistance to sheepmeats will decline from over 
100 percent in 1984 to 12 percent in 1987 under current policy; a 
reduction in assistance from $327 million in 1984 dollar terms to $34 
million. 
The estimates shown in Table 2 suffer from the same deficiency 
as those mentioned earlier for Table 1. With further analysis it may 
turn out that the residual protection for sheepmeats in 1987 will be 
only a fraction of the 12 percent figure given in the Table. 
On April 10 1984 the Government agreed on a basis for 
negotiation on future import tariff and licensing arrangements with the 
Manufacturers Federation. Those negotiations are currently under way 
with the new Government. 
In July 1984, the new Government devalued the dollar, 
accelerated the planned increases in import licence tendering and 
announced a phased withdrawal of SMP's. In 1984, the Minister of Trade 
and Industry announced a phased de-regulation of the wheat industry and 
the flour industry. The Budget of November 1984 included plans to 
remove a number of agricultural subsidies over the next two years. A 




These changes extended policy adjustments in 
tobacco, egg and wheat industries. The publication of 
in July 1984 needs to be seen in this light. 
the transport, 
Treasury views 
The Economic Management report (Treasury 1984A) and Land Use 
Issues (Treasury 1984B) consist of a collection of views of Treasury 
officials on further changes that might be considered. It is probably 
fair to say that the public was surprised by what the 'Opening of the 
Books' documents consisted of. When it was announced prior to the 
election that the poor state of the Economy would be revealed in the 
'Opening of the Books' immediately afterwards then it might have been 
reasonable to expect that the publication would describe and analyse 
the current state of industries and institutions in a detailed fashion, 
thereby providing the public with much fuller information upon which to 
base their views on changes that might be necessary. These documents 
do very little by way of reporting the current performance of the 
economy except at the macro level. The structure, conduct and 
performance of industry is not examined at all from an empiricial point 
of view. 
Instead, the reports summarise selected views on where existing 
policy instruments 'might' not be performing adequately and what 





fact that many of 
the November budget 
reports ought to 
are more than that. 
the suggestions in the July reports 
added fuel to the debate as to whether 
be considered as 'White Papers' or 
At the time of writing (June, 1985) a large part of what might 
be considered the New Agricultural Policy, has been set in place. This 
has involved a major reduction in assistance to the export portion of 
the Agricultural Sector. 
The marketing portion of the agricultural sector has not been 
the subject of Government regulatory changes, yet. The biggest 
uncertainty, however, lies on the production cost side of the ledger. 
This includes the future of import licensing and the height of the 
tariff to replace this system, and the future cost structure of the 
service sector (including Government). 
In contrast to the change in agricultural policy, import 
continues to be negotiated. Sectors with Industry Development 
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TABLE lA DIRECT GOVERNtffiNT ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE- AGRICULTURE VOTE, 1934/35 to 1984/85 (millions current dollars) 
Category 
84/85(a) 83/84 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Ag. Assistance Fund 
Fertilizer & Lime Transport 
Fertilizer Price 
Fertilizer Bounty 
SMP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
Other Product Price Subsidy 
Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure 
Meat Indusrty Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.-Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agrcultural Pests Control 
Assitance to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Su-bsidy on Milk 
Control of Animal Diseases 
Compensation 
Grants to Ag. Organisations 
Noxious Weed Eradication 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Greeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ Wool Board 
Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Cartage Grant 
Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance 
Feed Storage Construction 
Farmer Assist.-Interest on Loan 
Sheep Measles Control 
Eradication of Bovine TE 
Fertilizer & Lioe ~erial Subsidy 
Weedicide & Pescicide Subsidy 








































































































































































































200.353 106.310 112.796 150.626 
:,'lUl"Cll: Appendices to the Journals of the House of Represencatives, 1J35-84 
TABLE 1A CONTINUED 
Category YEAR 
74/75 73/74 72/73 71/72 70/71 69/70 68/69 67/68 66/67 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Assistance Fund .003 .185 9.786 
Fertilizer & Lime Transpor~ 8.182 11.649 12.480 8.945 7.050 5.579 3.165 2.367 2.632 
Fertilizer Subsidy 35.502 8.814 19.092 13 .134 5.366 
Fertilizer Bounty 
SNP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
.\ Other Product Price Subsidy 
Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure .145 .951 .192 .313 3.541 .477 .316 .216 .068 
Meat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.- Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agricultural Pests Control 3.025 2.728 2.535 2.339 2.173 1.958 1.918 2.044 2.040 
Assist. to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Subsidy on Milk 
Control of Animal Diseases 2.979 2.985 3.604 2.132 1.396 1.272 
Compensation .068 .019 .004 .003 .005 .007 .026 
Grants to Ag. Organisations 1.434 4.583(f) 18.250(g) 28.953(h) 1.666(i) .498 .400 .370 .470 
Noxious Weed Eradication .761 .766 .740 .512 .494 .376 .385 .358 .354 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Breeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ Wood Board 2.879 4.400 4.163 3.812 
Lucerne Establishment Grant .417 
Cartage Grant 
Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance .492 .572 .456 .241 .128 .088 
Feed Storage Construction .219 
Farmer Assit.- Interest on Loan .068 .044 .173 .032 
Sheep Measles Control .162 
Eradication of Bovine TB .080 .027 1.063 1.028 1. 290 N V1 
Fertilizer & Lime Aerial Subsidy .432 1.104 .497 
Ileedicide & Pesticide Subsidy 2.479 5.416 4.701 4.021 3.259 
Milk in Schools Program .014 .075 .355 .389 .668 1.820 
SUBTOTAL-AGRICULTURE 56.333 40.505 68.236 65.813 35.701 13.369 7.63!') 7.051 ,3.700 
TABLE lA CONTINUED 
Category 
65/66 64/65 63/64 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Assistance Fund 
Fertilizer & Lime Transport 1.514 .110 .084 
Fertilizer Price Subsidy 
Fertilizer Bounty 
SHP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
Other Product Price Subsidy 
,1. Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure .190 .330 .004 
Meat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.- Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agricultural Pests Control 1.912 1.696 1. 778 
Assist. to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Subsidy on Hilk 
Control of Animal Diseases 
Compensation .006 .008 .038 
Grants to Ag. Organisations .330 .374 .268 
Noxious Weed Eradication .342 .286 .266 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Breeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ Wood Board 
Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Cartage Grant 
Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance 
Feed Storage Construction 
Farmer Assist.- Interest on Loan 
Sheep Heas1es Control 
Eradication of Bovine TB 1.418 I'J80 1.448 
Fertilizer & Lime Aerial Subsidy 
Weedicide & Pesticide Subsidy 
Hilk in Schools Program 1.660 1.556 1.446 
SUBTOTAL-AGRICULTURE 7.372 5.940 5.332 
YEAR 
62/63 61/62 60/61 
.082 .080 .088 
.104 .0lD .040 
1.594 1.472 1.360 
.050 .622 .760 
.250 .254 .242 
.264 .256 .280 
1. 264 .950 
1.364 1.358 1. 534 





















TABLE lA CONTINUED 
Category YEAR 
56/57 55/56 54/55 53/54 52/53 51/52 50/51 49/50 48/49 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Assistance Fund 
Fertilizer & Lime Transport .912 .964(k) 1.118 .988 1.268 2.108 1.746 1.454 1.068 
Fertilizer Price Subsidy 
Fertilizer Bounty 
SMP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
Other Product Price Subsidy 
Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure .028 .052 .001 .002 .014 
Meat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.- Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agricultural Pests Control 1.496 1.360 1.430 1.430 1.446 1.376 .958 .814 .316 
Assist. to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Subsidy on Bilk 
Control of Animal Diseases 
Compensation .208 .196 .220 .302 .296 .300 .086 .080 .078 
Grants to Ag. Organisations .119 .100 .108 .098 .100 .105 .084 .067 .063 
Noxious Weed EradicaU.on .162 .164 .154 .152 .104 .094 .060 .072 .064 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Breeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ Wood Board 
Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Cartage Grant 
Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance 
Feed Storage Construction 
Farmer Assist.- Interest on Loan 
Sheep Measles Control 
Eradication of Bovine TE N 
-....J Fertilizer & Lime Aerial Subsidy 
11eedicide & Pesticide Subsidy 
Hilk in Schools Program 1.172 1.062 1.046 1.014 .960 .904 .736 .640 .470 
SUBTOTAL-AGRICULTURE !+ ~ ';97 3.398 !;.on 3.986 4.174 4.887 3.684 3.127 2.059 
TABLE 1A CONTINUED 
Category 
47/48(1) 46/47(1) 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Assistance Fund 
Fertilizer & Lime Transport 4.798 10.618 
Fertilizer Price Subsidy 
Fertilizer Bounty 
SNP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
Other Product Price Subsidy 
Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure .022 
Meat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.- Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agricultral Pests Control .204 .152 
Assist. to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Subsidy on Milk 
Control of Animal Diseases 
Compensation .078 .081 
Grants to Ag. Organisations .058 .102 
Noxious Weed Eradication .064 .056 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Breeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ l~ood Board 
Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Cartage Grant 
Pip fruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance 
Feed Storage Construction 
Farmer Assist.- Interest on Loan 
Sheep Measles Control 
Eradication of Bovine TB 
Fertilizer & Lime Aera1 Subsidy 
Weedicide & Pesticide Subsidy 
Milk in Schools Program .472 .456 
SUBTOrAL-ACRICULr~RE 5.674 11.487 
YEAR 
45/46 44/45 43/44 
.840 .804 .746 
.168(m) .158 .160 
.124 .128 .090 
.078 .064 .074 
.052 .125(j) .120 
.052 .050 .040 
.405 .344 .294 
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TABLE lA CONTINUED 
Category 
Sulphuric Acid Transport 
Special Assistance Fund 
Fertilizer & Li~e Transport 
Fertilizer Price Subsidy 
Fertilizer Bounty 
S}IP Scheme(*): Wool 
Meat 
Dairy 
Other Product Price Subsidy 
Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan 
Emergency Expenditure 
Heat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Land Dev.- Concess. on Interest 
Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
Control of Potato Nematode 
Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Agricultural Pests Control 
Assist. to Hydatids Authority 
Consumer Subsidy on Milk 
Control of Animal Diseases 
Compensation 
Grants to Ag. Organisations 
Noxious Heed Eradication 
Special Paymt. for Sheep&Cattle 
Artifical Breeding Incentive 
Dairy Beef Scheme 
Grant to NZ \~ood Board 
Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Cartage Grant 
Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
Lime Transport Assistance 
Feed Storage Construction 
Farmer Assist.- Interest on Loan 
Sheep Neasles Control 
Eradication of Bovine TB 
Fertilizer & Lime Aerial Subsidy 
Weedicide & 2esticide Subsidy 













































T_\8LE 1B DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE-LANDS&SURVEY,FORESTRY AND DSIR, 1934/35 to 1984/85 (millions current dollars) 
Category YEAR 
84/85(a) 83/84 82/83 81/82 80/81 79/80 78/79 77 /78 76/77 75/76 
Lands & Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College .060 .048 .047 .045 .038 .031 .028 .021 .019 .019 
Tus. Gr.&Mt Land Inst. .516 .512 .463 .423 .364 .274 .228 .135 
SUBTOTAL-L&~DS &SURVEY .576 .560 .510 .468 .402 .305 .256 .156 .019 .019 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants 97.805(a) 25.306(a) 3.404(a) 2.004 1.461 1.528 1.135 1.115 .786 .642 
DSIR: 
Grants: Massey University .168 .196 .209 .238 .209 .158 .154 .145 .096 .070 
Lincoln College .136 .252 .020 .078 .085 .071 .061 .048 .036 
Trials of New Horticul. Crops .007 .010 .019 
WRONZ- Research Contract .075 
Research Assoc.- Opere Costs: 
Dairy 1. 631 1.592 1.438 1.355 1.193 1.055 .964 .759 .607 .601 
Fert. l-fanufacturers .364 .321 .319 .267 .288 .195 .120 .150 .164 .118 
Meat 1. 631 1.261 1.280 L091 1.141 .720 .751 .626 .557 .488 
Wool 1.087 1.061 .958 .893 .782 .658 .620 .529 .426 .397 
Research Assoc.- New Bldgs: 
Dairy Res. Institute .280 .682 .797 .150 
Iffi.ONZ .070 .034 .072 
Fert. Hanufacturers .005 .018 
Meat R~search Inst. .094 .007 .093 
Grants: Commonwealth Ag Bureau .201 .173 .160 .147 .1l5 .094 .090 .087 .175 .096 
Cawthron Institute .560 .537 .505 .477 .410 .366 .287 .227 .226 .152 
SUBTOTAL-DSIR 5.992 6.041 6.027 4.675 4.257 3.496 3.057 2.584 2.299 1. 955 
GRA~D TOTAL (Including Ag Vote): 557.~89 645.113 359.784 179.897 114.769 119.288 204.801 110.165 115.900 153.2~5 
Source; Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 19~5-19S4. 
w 
o 
TABLE IB CONTI:-:IUED 
Category YEAR 
74/75 73/74 72/73 71/72 70/71 69/70 68/69 67/68 66/67 
Lands & Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College .016 .015 .0lD .010 .010 
Tus. Gr.& Mt Land Inst. 
SUBTOTAL-LANDS &SURVEY .016 .015 .010 .010 .010 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants .535 .316 .187 .090 
DSIR: 
Grants: Hassey University .058 .030 .025 .014 .014 .013 .009 .002 .002 
Lincoln College .027 .023 .025 .026 .051 .047 .051 .028 .024 
Trials of New Horticult. Crops 
WRONZ- Research Contract 
Research Assoc.- Oper. Costs: 
Dairy .520 .445 .480 .452 .340 .318 .261 .232 .390 
Fert. Manufacturers .093 .063 .066 .055 .044 .049 .038 .030 .020 
Meat .455 .326 .278 .310 .133 .103 .103 .085 .086 
Wool .385 .355 .330 .345 .301 .301 .193 .183 .168 
Research Assoc.- New Bldgs: 
Dairy Res. Institute 
WRONZ 
Fert. ~wnufacturers .009 
Meat Res. Institute .110 .110 
Grants: Commonwealth Ag Bureau .087 .045 .050 .036 .036 .036 .036 .034 .060 
Cawthron Institiute .124 .092 .076 .056 .046 .044 .042 .040 .034 
SUBTOTAL-DSIR 1. 749 1.489 1.449 1.294 .965 .911 .733 .634 .784 
w 
GRAND TOTAL (Including Ag Vote): 58.633 42.325 69.882 67.207 36.676 14.860 3.369 7.085 9.':'8" 
,I 
TABLE 1B CONTINUED 
Category 
65/66 64/65 63/64 
Lands & Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College 
Tus. Gr .&~1t Land Inst. 
SUBTOTAL-L~S &SURVEY 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants 
DSIR: 
Grants: ~~ssey University .002 .014 .010 
Lincoln College .024 .036 .020 
Trials of New Horticult. Crops 
WRONZ- Research Contract 
Research Assoc.- Oper. Costs: 
Dairy .242 .148 .146 
Fert. ~nufacturers .020 .018 .020 
Meat .086 .078 .068 
Wool .218 .164 .114 
Research Assoc.- New Bldgs: 
Dairy Res. Institute 
WRONZ 
Fert. Manufacturers 
Meat Res. Institute 
Grants: Commonwealth Ag Bureau .060 .054 .060 
Cawthron Institute .032 .030 .028 
SUBTOTAL-DSIR .684 .542 .466 



























































TABLE lB CONTINUED 
Category 
56/57 
Lands Ex Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College 
Tus. Gr.&Mt Land Inst. 
SUBTOTAL-LANDS &SURVEY 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants 
55/56 54/55 
YEAR 
53/54 52/53 51/52 50/51 49/50 48/49 
TABLE 1B CONTINUED 
Category 
47/48 46/47 
Lands & Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College 
Tus. Gr.&Ht Land Inst. 
SUBTOTAL-LANDS &SL~VEY 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants 
DSIR: 
Grants: ~illssey University .014 .014 
Lincoln College .010 .016 
Trials of New Horticu1t. Crops 
I-IRONZ- Research Contract 
Research Assoc- Oper. Costs: 
Dairy .034 
Fert. ~illnufacturers .006 
Meat 
1-1001 .005 .004 
Research Assoc.- New Bldgs: 
Dairy Res. Institute 
I-lRONZ 
Fert. Manufacturers 
Meat Res. Ipstitute 
Grants: CommoOlveal th Ag Bureau .018 .008 
Cawthron Institute .014 .010 
SUBTOTAL-DSIR .101 .052 






































TABLE IB CONTINUED 
Category 
Lands & Survey: 
Grants: Lincoln College 
Tus. Gr.&Mt Land Inst. 
SUBTOTAL-LANDS &SURVEY 
Forest Service: 
Forestry Encouragement Grants 
SUBTOTAL-FOREST SERVICE 
DSIR: 
Grants: Hassey University 
Lincoln College 
Trials of New Horticult. 
WRONZ- Research Contract 





Research Assoc.- New Bldgs: 
Grants: 
Dairy Res. Institute 
HRONZ 
Fert. Hanufacturers 
11eat Res. Institute 
Commom~eal th Ag Bureau 
Cawthron Institute 
SUBTOTAL-DSIR 
GRAND TOT,~ (Including Ag Voce): 
38/39 37/38 36/37 
.002 .002 .002 
.002 .002 .002 












A P PEN D I X 2 
37. 
TABLE 2A ESTIMATED NOHINAL PRICE HARGINS OVER HORLD PRICE LEVELS DUE TO HIPORT PROTECTION IN HANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
AND TOTAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE TARIFFS- SELECTED YEARS 1894 TO 1981/84 (PERCENT) 
Manufacturing Industry Group: 


















Other Transport Goods 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE 
(a) Included in Hool Textiles 
(b) Included in l1achinery 
1894 
2600 
(c) Included in Vehicle Assembly 
Sources: Condliffe [1936:250] 
1896 
25.0 
N.Z. Planning Council [1984:31] 
Dept. of Statistics L1982/83:8-9] 
Pickford [1984J 
1906 1908 1925 













































































































TABLE 2B MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY WEIGHTING FACTORS USED IN DERVIVI~G WEIGHTED AVERAGE TARIFFS 
Manufacturing Industry Group: 1982/83 Weighting Factors(a) 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 









































1955/58 1964/67 1978/79 1981/84 
& 1972/73 
.085 .085 .171 
.090 .090 .181 
.003 .003 
.006 .006 .014 
.003 .003 .006 
.021 .021 .042 
.003 .003 .005 
.012 .012 .025 
.015 .015 
.044 .044 .089 
.006 .006 .013 
.019 .019 .038 
.098 .098 
.040 .040 .080 
.289 .343 
.054 (g) .108 
.100 .136 
.036 ( h) .072 
.076 .076 .155 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
(a) Derived as a % of total 1982/83 CIF' value of selected Hanufacturing Industry Groups above. 
(b) l~ooden articles, cork & basketware 
(c) Includes paper, paperboard & articles of paper pulp or paperboard 
(d) Artifical resins & plastic materials, cel1ul.)se esters & ethers 
(e) Essential oils & perfume materils, toliet, polishing & cleansing preparations 
(f) Includes photographic appartus, equipment & supplies, optical goods, & other miscellaneous man-
ufactured goods 
(g) Included in 'Machinery' 
(h) Included in 'Vehicle Assembly' 
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